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Abstract
Purpose
This paper examines the effect of IFRS on the performance of UK investment
closed-end trust funds with domestic equity focus using Carhart’s Four-Factor
model.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper is based on the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which argues that all
available information is already included in the price of assets and therefore,
investors cannot beat the market or generate abnormal returns.
Findings
The results show that on average UK investment trusts do not generate abnormal
returns, nor is their performance persistent. Our study provides empirical evidence
to supports the efficient market hypotheses, and provides proof that the adoption of
IFRS has on average, a decreasing impact on the excess returns generated by UK
investment trusts.
Originality/Value
The findings of the paper have business policy implications for investment trust in
the UK.
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21. Introduction
Some studies consider the assessment of performance in mutual funds as a test of the Efficient
Market Hypothesis (EMH), which assumes, that all information is already included in the
prices of assets and that investors cannot beat the market or generate abnormal returns (Fama,
1970). Therefore, finding evidence of performance persistence would suggest, that the market
is not semi-strong efficient. On the other hand, any evidence of no persistence in fund
performance would support the EMH and suggest that abnormal returns generated by fund
managers are due to luck and not to skill (Fama, 1970). Some studies (Treynor and Mazuy,
1966; Jensen, 1968; Elton et al., 1996; Phelps and Detzel, 1997; and Henriksson, 1984) find
no evidence of persistence in abnormal fund returns over various periods. This implies that
past performance do not predict future performance. On the other hand, studies by Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980), Hendricks et al (1993) find evidence of persistence of fund performance
suggesting that fund managers have the ability to generate abnormal returns. Though Angelidis
et al. (2013) observe that mutual fund managers are evaluated against the benchmark stated in
the fund’s prospectus; therefore their performance is guided by the nature of that benchmark.
Some other studies such as Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Grinblatt et al (1995), Gruber
(1996), Carhart (1997), Daniel et al. (1997) and Wermers (2000) find persistence of
performance over short periods of time. Good performance can at least partly be attributed to
managerial skill, though on average, funds generate negative abnormal returns. Others have
examined whether companies that use local research offices show superior investment
performance than others (Hung, 2001). However, Carhart (1997) shows that persistence of fund
performance among top performers disappears and remains only in low performers, where it
probably arises from high transaction expenses. This is because fund performance is more
strongly affected by the fund manager’s ability to minimize downside losses rather than
selecting outperforming portfolio particularly in buyouts rather than venture capitals (Buchner
et al., 2016).
Most of the aforementioned studies however focus on open-end funds (Berk and Green, 2004;
Bangassa et al, 2012) and only a few studies evaluate the performance or persistence of closed-
end funds which differ from open-end funds. Few studies have examined the performance and
persistence of closed-end funds in the UK, particularly the performance of UK investment
trusts. Bal and Leger (1996), Leger (1997), Hooper et al (2006), Allen and Tan (1999) and
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end funds. Our study extends the literature on closed-end funds, particularly UK investment
trusts by investigating the performance of UK closed-end funds over the more recent period
from 1997 to 2014. Unlike open-end funds, closed-end funds sell a fixed amount of shares,
thus managers of closed-end funds do not have to deal with unexpected fund inflows in a period
with few investment opportunities. As there are significant differences between opened and
closed ends funds, and with differing implications for investors, results of previous studies on
the open-end fund industry cannot be applied to the closed-end fund industry.
In theory, fund managers possess certain expertise, which allow them to continuously generate
abnormal returns and most investors are willing to invest on the basis funds’ prior performance.
In addition to testing if UK investment trusts can generate persistent abnormal returns, the
paper also investigates whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) across the European Union (EU) in 2005 have significant effect on the performance of
investment funds. Following the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) public companies have to disclose more information about their financial position
making it easier for investors to make investment decisions. On the other hand, the additional
information becomes available for all market participants, making the markets more efficient
and therefore harder to generate abnormal returns.
Advocates of IFRS argue that a uniform system of financial reporting will enhance
comparability of financial statements, reduce information asymmetry and therefore attract
foreign investors (DeFond et al, 2011 and Bielstein, et al, 2007). Therefore the EU wide
adoption of IFRS in 2005 should improve the financial statement comparability leading to
increase in investments and improved performance of the UK investment trust funds.
Improved comparability and transparency of financial statements will be attractive to
investment trust fund investors as they are likely to base their investment decisions on the basis
of such comparable and detailed analysis of the financial statements (DeFund et al, 2011). The
adoption of IFRS in itself will not improve fund performance except if it is faithfully
implemented (IASB, 2008; Henry, 2008). However, the UK has a strong enforcement rate
(Leuz et al, 2003), including IFRS implementation which has a subsequent positive impact on
performance of investment funds. DeFund et al (2011) confirm that IFRS adoption results in a
greater increase in mutual fund investment in countries, such as the UK, with strong
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analysing its impact on UK investment funds.
However, there is a gap in the literature on studies examining the effect of IFRS on investment
fund performance. This is because several studies on IFRS focus on other aspects and
functionality of the financial market, such as accuracy of analysts’ forecasts (Jiao et al, 2012),
foreign investment (Gordon et al, 2012; Nnadi and Sooberayen, 2015), information content of
earnings announcement (Landsman et al, 2012), foreign and home ownership bias of mutual
funds (deFond et al, 2011; Covrig et al, 2007). Other studies examine whether IFRS affects
persistence of earnings. For example, Doukakis (2010) examines whether the mandatory
adoption of IFRS has an impact on the information content of earnings components for
future profitability, and the results suggest that IFRS measurement and reporting
guidelines do not seem to improve the persistence of earnings and earnings components.
To the best of our knowledge, this is first study to investigate the impact of IFRS on the
performance of UK investment funds. In theory, the adoption of IFRS should make the UK
market more efficient and therefore more difficult for fund managers to generate abnormal
returns.
Most studies on mutual funds argue that due to the efficient market hypothesis, mutual funds
usually do not outperform their pre-set benchmark, nor are their performance persistent (Berks
and Green, 2004; Hooper et al, 2006). This implies that positive performance is most
commonly based on luck and not the manager’s skill-set. Consequently, Berk and Green (2004)
propose that performance is not persistent and investments with active managers do not
outperform the passive benchmarks on average. However, the lack of persistence in returns
does not imply that managerial skills and ability are unrewarded or that gathering information
about performance is socially wasteful.
We therefore investigate if the mandatory adoption of IFRS had any influence on the
performance of UK domestic Investment trusts.
Hence, this paper addresses the following three questions:
1. Do UK domestic investment trusts generate abnormal returns?
2. Is there any persistence in UK domestic investment trust performance?
3. Does the adoption of IFRS have any influence on UK domestic investment trust
performance?
5The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 is the literature review, Section 3 is the
development of research hypotheses, and Section 4 describes the data used in the study and
Section 5 is the methodology, Section 6 is the presentation and discussion of results, Section 7
is the summary of findings and Section 8 is the conclusion.
2. Literature review
The main difference between closed-end and open-end funds, is that closed-end funds collect a
limited amount of capital through issuing a fixed amount of shares, which are then traded on a
public stock exchange and over-the-counter. On the other hand, open-end funds are traded
over-the-counter and continue to receive capital inflows throughout their lifetime. Anderson et
al (1996) explain that the price of closed-end fund shares is similar to other traded securities
which are determined by supply and demand, investors’ perception and the state of the
economy. This implies that their shares can trade below or above their Net Asset Value. On
the contrary, open-end fund shares trade at their Net Asset Value including loading charges.
Several studies have been undertaken to examine performance and persistence of funds.
Grinblatt and Titman (1992) analyse past performance of mutual funds and identify
significantly higher consistency of performance of losers rather than winners. Their results
show evidence that the difference in performance of funds persists over time and such
persistence is consistent with the fund manager’s ability to outperform the benchmark. Such
benchmarks are usually set out in the fund’s prospectus (Angelidis et al. (2013). Results in
fund persistence have been mixed. Hendricks et al (1993) find that in the period from 1974 to
1988, the relative performance of growth-oriented mutual funds persists in the short term,
although they find the most significant evidence over a one-year evaluation period. Malkiel
(1995) investigates the persistence in performance from 1971 to 1991 and finds no persistence
in performance and concludes that previous findings of persistence in performance could be
attributed to the time period evaluated.
Study by Carhart (1997) finds no evidence that persistence in performance can be attributed to
the skill and experience of fund managers, but rather the worst-return mutual funds experience
persistence in performance. Zheng (1999) shows that funds that outperform in a period
subsequently perform significantly better than the funds that underperformed in the previous
6period and therefore implies that winning funds outperform the market in the long term.
Anderson et al. (1996) argue that managers of closed-end funds focus better on long term
performance than short term market fluctuations. This is because closed-end fund managers do
not deal with unexpected fund inflows or hold cash reserves which allow investors to withdraw
money like open-end fund managers. In fact, Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin (2016) suggest
that closed-end funds with higher board ownerships are better aligned with shareholders'
interests. Therefore, closed-end fund managers can better focus on available opportunities in
the market, whilst open-end fund managers might receive an unexpected fund inflow when
there are fewer opportunities on the market.
The differences between open-end and closed-end funds are based on their trading strategies.
For instance, closed-end funds are less restricted than open-end funds, and the latter can issue
and redeem shares throughout their lifetime. To be able to redeem shares at any time, open-
end funds have to maintain a specific amount of their capital in cash, which restricts their
investment opportunities. This can be challenging given the different investment opportunities
in the market. Bers and Madura (2000) explain the problem of investment timing for open-end
fund managers, since investors usually invest more capital, when the market is bearish and
redeem capital when the market is bullish, which forces the fund managers to use adverse
investment timing strategies. In this regards, Gupta and Jithendranathan, (2012) argue that
that investors base their investment decisions on the past performance of funds, and that
retail investors prefer less risky investments compared to wholesale investors. Therefore,
closed-end funds face lower transaction costs, since they are not overwhelmed with unexpected
cash inflows or redemption requests. Additionally, open-end funds can issue only one class of
shares, which is common stock, while closed-end funds can issue preferred and common stock
or leverage through debt issue (Bers and Madura, 2000).
Bal and Leger (1996) analysed the performance of 92 UK investment trusts from 1975 to 1993
using the Sharpe, Jensen and Treynor measures. Their results portray two distinctive findings.
First, on average funds underperformed compared to the market portfolio even without
correcting for transaction costs. Second, funds ranked by the Sharpe measure portray
significant intertemporal persistence in performance. These results are corroborated by Leger
(1997) who finds very weak performance with little persistence in measures of “timing” and
“selectivity”. The results show negative timing performance for approximately one third of
investment trusts in the sample, though the patterns of significant selectivity and timing tend
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performance of 218 UK investment trusts from July 1981 to June 2009 find weak evidence for
selectivity and timing abilities, but interestingly the GJR-GARCH-M method reverses their
results, providing evidence for selectivity ability for international funds and timing ability for
domestic funds. Fama and French (2010) analyse the aggregate returns of a sample of 3156
actively managed mutual funds between 1984 and 2006 using the CAPM, Three-Factor model
and the Carhart Four-Factor model. Their analysis shows, that after deducting expenses, the
funds in their sample on average underperform the benchmark index. These studies provide an
overall evidence of diverse results between international and domestic funds.
The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) around the world and in
the European Union (EU) represents the largest change of accounting regulations of the past
decade. In 2002, the European Union adopted the IAS Regulation, thereby requiring its entire
member states to mandatory adopt and follow the rules of IFRS starting from January 1st, 2005.
This event required more than 7,000 public companies to switch from their domestic
accounting standards to IFRS and triggered speculations on the impact of IFRS on the amount
of information available to financial analysts and consequently on investor’s behaviour (Byard
et al., 2011). According to Ball (2006), the adoption of IFRS can potentially increase cross-
border comparability, accounting report transparency, as well as reduce information costs and
asymmetry, and with a consequent increase on the liquidity and efficiency of markets. These
benefits rely on the assumption that the mandatory IFRS adoption increases the comparability
of published accounting information across countries and provides superior information to
market participants (Horton et al., 2013; Nnadi and Soobaroyen, 2015).
Additionally, Horton et al. (2013) argue that the mandatory IFRS adoption has a decreasing
effect on forecast errors for firms that mandatorily adopted the IFRS compared to the forecast
errors of other firms. They conclude that IFRS improves the quality of information
intermediation in capital markets as well as the quality of information and comparability of
accounting reports. The adoption of IFRS also stimulates the volume of trading. For instance,
Brüggemann et al. (2010) examined the impact of IFRS adoption on cross-border equity
investments of individual investors and find a significant increase in open market trading
volume following the implementation of IFRS. These results suggest that the worldwide
adoption of accounting standards enhances cross-border equity investments.
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associated with the adoption of IFRS in the European Union. They find a more positive reaction
for firms with lower information quality prior to the adoption and a less positive reaction for
firms located in code law countries. This is due to investors’ concerns over enforcement of
IFRS in those countries. Overall, their findings suggest, that there are net benefits associated
with the adoption of IFRS for European investors. Even in countries with overreaching
government control such as China, the convergence to the IFRS has been reported as reducing
earnings management (Ho et al, 2015; Nnadi, 2015). Florou and Pope (2012) provide evidence
that institutional investments increased in firms that adopt the IFRS, which can be explained
by an increase of investors’ confidence due to the positive impact of the adoption of IFRS.
Although such impacts vary across different European countries, for example, firms in
countries with stronger law enforcement systems benefit from IFRS adoption more than the
ones in countries with weaker enforcement systems (Pope and McLeay, 2011).
3. Development of research hypotheses
The current study is underpinned by the Efficient Market Hypothesis, we argue that with the
additional information that becomes publically available on public companies, the market
should become more efficient thus more difficult for fund managers to generate abnormal
returns. The majority of previous research undertaken to investigate the performance and
persistence in performance of mutual funds conclude, that there is little evidence of persistence
of fund performance, additionally, on average mutual funds do not generate significant
abnormal returns.
The aim of this paper is to expand the existing literature on closed-end funds by examining the
persistence in performance of UK investment trusts that allocate their capital mainly in UK
domestic securities. In addition, we investigate whether the adoption of IFRS across the
European Union, has any impact on investment trust performance. The adoption of IFRS makes
more information available about public companies and makes it easier for fund managers to
assess the financial performance of a company, and therefore make more profitable investment
decisions and generate higher returns. However, the EMH suggests, that all information is
already included in the price of a security and that security prices follow a random walk (Fama,
91970). Therefore, in a highly efficient UK market, fund managers should not be able to generate
abnormal returns. Therefore the first hypothesis is:
H1: Closed-end UK investment trusts do not generate abnormal returns
According to the EMH, security prices follow a random walk; therefore past returns cannot be
used to predict future returns. Thus, abnormal returns generated by fund managers are due to
luck and not to skill. Therefore, there should be no persistence in UK investment trust
performance. Our paper investigates if there is any persistence in UK investment trust
performance and our second hypothesis is:
H2: There is no persistence in UK closed-end investment trust performance
Since January 2005, public companies incorporated in the UK are mandatorily required to
prepare their financial statements in line with the IFRS. The EU wide adoption of IFRS aims
to increase, unify and internationalise the information disclosed by public companies. Thus,
the UK market already being a very regulated and developed market should even become more
efficient. With more information being available about UK companies, investment trusts
companies are expected to find it more difficult to generate abnormal returns. Thus, we test if
the adoption of IFRS has an influence on UK investment trust performance and our third
hypothesis therefore is:
H3: The adoption of Accounting Standards has no significant influence on UK closed-end investment
trust performance
4. Data
Two datasets were used to analyse the UK investment trust performance — data on the
investment trusts and benchmark data for the four factors (Small-cap stocks minus large-cap
stocks, High book-to-market stocks minus low book-to-market stocks, Market risk premium
factor, Momentum factor), used in the Carhart Four-Factor model. The fund dataset used in
this paper consists of 119 UK domestic investment trust returns from FTSE 350 index
portfolios dating from January 1997 to December 2014 which are collected from DataStream.
To include the investment trust in the sample, the trust must not only be incorporated in the
UK, but also be primarily invested in UK equities. This method is used because only these
funds are appropriate to be measured against UK risk free rates and the Carhart Four-factors
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computed from FTSE 350 Index portfolios thus leaving 119 domestic investment trusts with
UK domestic equity focus.
The final step of the data collection procedure involves obtaining the monthly net asset values
(NAV) for the evaluation period from Datastream. This research uses the net asset values
instead of the share price because the price of investment trust shares is determined by supply
and demand as well as investors’ perception. Therefore their shares often trade at a discount to
the actual value of their portfolio. The NAV which is based on the total value of shares in a
fund’s portfolio is therefore considered more appropriate to measure the funds’ performance.
5. Methodology
This study evaluates the performance of 119 UK domestic investment trusts over six non-
overlapping three-year periods using panel data from January 1997 to December 2014 as
presented in Table 1. Our method follows Bangassa et al (2012) and applies the Carhart Four-
Factor Model, which is built on the classic Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Fama
and French Three-Factor model to measure fund performance.
Table 1: Breakpoints between sub-periods
The table below explains the breakpoints between the non-overlapping three-year sub-periods.
The reason for choosing three year sub-periods is to have enough observations for the regressions. Each sub-
period contains 36 monthly fund excess returns calculated from the funds’ monthly Net Asset Values. The first
step in measuring performance is to calculate the funds returns in excess of the risk free rate (funds return in
excess of the risk free rate = excess return). For every sub-period the monthly fund excess returns were
calculated. After subtracting the risk-free rate, the excess returns of 119 UK domestic investment trusts were
regressed on the Carhart Four-factors .
Jan 1997 –
Dec 1999
Jan 2000 –
Dec 2002
Jan 2003 –
Dec 2005
Jan 2006 –
Dec 2008
Jan 2009 –
Dec 2011
Jan 2012 –
Dec 2014
1st sub-period 2nd sub-period 3rd sub-period 4th sub-period 5th sub-period 6th sub-period
Carhart Four-Factor model posits that firms with higher returns in one period tend to keep the
same level of returns in the next period and it incorporates the momentum effect (Carhart,
1997). The Three-Factor model does not explain the momentum effect, which is one of its
shortcomings. The momentum effect is the empirically observed tendency of strong performing
stocks to outperform weak performing stocks in the next period (Jagadeesh and Titman, 1993).
The momentum factor developed by Carhart (1997) is an extension of the Three-Factor model
and captures the short term continuation effect of the funds, and its calculated as the difference
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of a portfolio with high momentum stocks and a portfolio with low momentum stocks. The
monthly yield of the three months UK Treasury bill represents the risk-free rate and the four
factors were constructed based on the 350 firms of the FTSE 350 index (Gregory et al., 2013).
We test for heteroscedasticity using Breusch-Pagan and the Breusch-Godfrey test for
autocorrelation and our regression equation is as follows:
Rt – Rf = αt + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt +  Ɛt ……… ……………….... 1
where:
    = Small-cap stocks minus large-cap stocks
    = High book-to-market stocks minus low book-to-market stocks
     = Market risk premium factor
    = Momentum factor
   = Error term
A high momentum factor coefficient m  indicates that a fund invested more in high momentum
stocks. The monthly NAV of each of the 119 funds in the sample are first converted into
monthly investment trust returns (R ). Then after subtracting the risk free rate (R ) from the
investment trust return, we obtain the fund’s excess return, which represents the funds returns
in excess of the risk-free rate. Each fund’s monthly excess return is then regressed on the
Carhart’s Four-Factor model. The Carhart Four-Factor model is used to calculate the abnormal
returns of 119 UK investment trusts. The FTSE 350 Index is used as the benchmark. Our period
of investigation is from January 1997 to December 2014 and is divided into six three-year (36
months) sub-periods which allows to have sufficient observations for the regressions using
monthly investment trust returns calculated from NAV.
Similar to Agarwal and Naik (2000), Malkiel and Saha (2005), and Eling (2009), we classify
fund performance persistence as winners and losers using a contingency table. While the
winner funds are those performing better than the benchmark of the FTSE 350 investment
funds, the losers are funds performing worse than the funds benchmark respectively. Thus
using the NAV which is based on the total value of shares in a fund’s portfolio, we classify a
fund as winner if it has a higher return in a specific period than the median return of all FTSE
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350 funds within the period. The result si presented in Table 2 below and shows that there are
more losers in periods 1, 3, 5 and 6 respectively.
Table 2: Winner and loser funds for the sub-periods
The table summarises the winner and losers funds in the sample of 119 UK domestic investment trusts for each
of the six three- year sub-periods. Loser fund are those that generate returns below those of the FTSE 350
benchmark, while winner funds generate returns above those of the FTSE 350 benchmark.
Sub-periods Winners Losers
1997-1999 28 (23.5%) 91 (76.5%)
2000-2002 75 (63%) 44 (37%)
2003-2005 49 (41.2%) 70 (58.8%)
2006-2008 72 (60.5%) 47 (39.5%)
2009-2011 42 (35.3%) 77 (64.7%)
2012-2014 43 (36.1%) 76 (63.9%)
Testing the influence of IFRS on UK investment trust performance
We use modified version of the Carhart Four-Factor model to test if the adoption of IFRS has
an impact on UK investment trust performance by using a dummy variable –AAS, as a proxy
for the adoption of accounting standards. This approach is consistent with Bangassa et al (2012)
which apply the modified form of the Carhart Four-Factor model in capturing the selectivity
and timing performance effects of UK trust investments. The use of dummy variable in
capturing the effect of IFRS impact on performance is very common in accounting literature
such as in the impact of IFRS regulatory change on FDI (Gordon et al, 2012); IFRS on regional
investments (Nnadi and Sooberayen, 2015); and IFRS on corporate governance (Judge et al
(2010). However, to ensure that our model does not just capture a temporary shift in the regime
caused by the financial crisis, we create a dummy CRISIS to disentangle the effect of IFRS
from the financial crisis. This approach is similar to Kontonikas et al (2013) which applied a
dummy variable to capture the effect of the financial crisis on state dependence during the
sudden rise in the federal fund rate (FFR) in the US.
The rationale underlining this test is that the EU wide adoption of accounting standards has
increased reporting transparency, reduced information asymmetry and thereby increased the
efficiency and competitiveness of markets. The EMH holds that more efficient market would
13
make it more difficult for fund managers to generate positive abnormal returns (Horton et al.,
2013). Our regression is run from 1997 to 2014 with the baseline date being 1st of January
2005, the date of mandatory adoption of IFRS, and is stated as:
Rt – Rf = αt + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt + β5AASt + β6CRISISt + Ɛt ………… 2
where:
AAS is a dummy variable for the Adoption of Accounting Standards (0 = from January 1997
to December 2004; 1 = from January 2005 to December 2014). The CRISIS dummy takes a
value of 1 during 2007 and 2008 and zero otherwise. All other variables are as in Carhart’s
Four-Factor model.
A positive coefficient indicates that the adoption of IFRS increased the excess fund returns,
while a negative coefficient indicates that the adoption of accounting standards has a negative
effect on funds excess returns. If the CRISIS dummy variable is negative and significant, then
we can conclude that it is indeed the effect of regime change.
Robustness check
To check test the reliability of our result on the impact of the AAS variable, which is used as a
proxy for the adoption of accounting standards, we re-estimate our model using observations
until end of 2006 prior to the financial crisis period. A negative effect will confirm that the
IFRS regime has a negative effect on the performance of the funds.
6. Presentation and discussion of results
Performance Results
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the monthly excess returns for each of the six
sub-periods.
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Table 3: Excess Return Descriptive Statistics
The table below presents the descriptive statistics of the monthly excess fund returns for each of the six sub-
periods. The excess returns represent the funds monthly returns in excess of the risk free rate and are derived
from 119 UK domestic equity investment trusts from January 1997 to December 2014. In order to measure the
performance of investment trusts. The Excess Returns of funds are computed in the following as:Excess Return = R  − r  
where R  is the return of fund at time t, r   is the UK risk free rate at time t. Each sub-period contains the data
for 119 funds with each 36 monthly excess returns, totalling 4,284 observations per sub-period. The average
values at the bottom of the table represent the average across all six sub-periods.
Variable Period Mean(%)
Median
(%)
Minimum
(%)
Maximum
(%)
Standard
Deviation
(%)
No of Obs.
Excess
Return
1997-
1999 1.005 0.877 -42.621 66.238 6.396 4,284
2000-
2002 -1.368 -0.695 -37.164 50.373 7.147 4,284
2003-
2005 1.263 1.095 -27.386 28.452 4.183 4,284
2006-
2008 -0.857 -0.081 -49.703 26.529 5.815 4,284
2009-
2011 0.888 0.747 -36.633 28.095 5.637 4,284
2012-
2014 0.918 0.686 -22.515 87.062 4.146 4,284
Average 1997-2014 0.308 0.438 -36.004 59.193 5.554 25,704
The mean monthly fund excess returns for each of the six periods shows that in four out of six
periods the funds on average are able to generate returns above those of the risk free rate
between 0.89% and 1.26%. In two out of six periods, the mean monthly excess returns are
below the returns of the risk-free rate and negative with values of -0.86% and -1.37%.
However, the average standard deviation of 5.55% across all periods as well as the minimum
and maximum values indicates that there is dispersion in funds excess returns across the sample
period. The next step in measuring performance is to regress the obtained excess fund returns
on the Carhart’s Four-Factor model. Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the R2
values obtained from the Carhart’s Four-Factor regression models for each of the six sub-
periods rounded to three decimals.
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Table 4: R2 Descriptive Statistics
The table below shows the descriptive statistics of the R2 values obtained from regressing the excess returns of
119 UK investment trusts on the four factors of Carhart’s Four-Factor model over the period from January
1997 to December 2014 in the following way:
Rt – Rf = αt + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt + Ɛt
The values at the bottom of the table represent the average across all six sub-periods.
Variable Period Mean(%)
Median
(%)
Minimum
(%)
Maximum
(%)
Standard
Deviation
(%)
No of Obs.
R2
1997-
1999 69.351 75.870 24.155 90.349 15.829 119
2000-
2002 74.720 78.968 25.745 93.732 15.716 119
2003-
2005 69.077 75.747 22.032 95.622 19.346 119
2006-
2008 69.398 74.892 20.998 95.363 19.025 119
2009-
2011 71.923 77.958 22.947 92.025 16.880 119
2012-
2014 67.654 72.490 19.538 90.240 18.367 119
Average 1997-2014 70.354 75.988 22.569 92.889 17.527 714
The estimates for the R2 values across all periods range between 19.54% and 95.62%. The
mean R2 for all the periods is 70.35%, indicating that about 70% of the excess returns of UK
domestic investment trusts can be explained by the FTSE 350 Index. However, the average
minimum value of 22.57% indicates, that there were some funds in the sample, where the FTSE
350 Index had a weak explanatory power for their excess returns.
The main objective of regressing each funds excess return on the four factors of Carhart’s
model is to obtain the intercepts (Alphas) for each fund. The Alpha represents the abnormal
returns of the fund and is the main measure of performance used in this study. Table 5 reports
the average coefficient values and the significance of the Carhart’s Four-Factor model.
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Table 5: Carhart Four-Factor Coefficient Regression Results
The table below reports the average coefficient values obtained from regressing the excess returns of 119 UK
investment trusts on the Carhart’s Four-Factor model for each of the six sub-periods from January 1997 to
December 2014 in the following way:
Rt – Rf = αt + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt + Ɛt
The Alpha    represents the abnormal fund return based on the model above. RMRF, SMB, HML and MOM
are the four factors of Carharts Four-Factor model.
The R2 values at the bottom of the table represent the average R2 for each of the six sub-periods.
Sub-periods
1997-
1999
2000-
2002
2003-
2005
2006-
2008
2009-
2011
2012-
2014
Intercept ( )
Coefficient -0.0023 * 0.0045 * -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0015 ** -0.0006
RMRF
Coefficient 0.9666 * 0.8331 * 0.7779 * 0.9004 * 0.8905 * 0.8366 *
SMB
Coefficient 0.3139 * 0.3644 * 0.4462 * 0.1382 * 0.1045 * 0.2968 *
HML
Coefficient 0.0394 ** -0.2088 * 0.151 * -0.075 * -0.1778 * -0.2350 *
MOM
Coefficient 0.0971 * -0.078 * 0.0419 * -0.0967 * -0.0038 -0.0713 *
Average R2 0.6935 0.7472 0.6908 0.694 0.7192 0.6765
* indicates a significance at 1% level
** indicates a significance at 5% level
*** indicates a significance at 10% level
As can be seen from the table above, most of the obtained coefficients are significant at 1%
level of significance indicating that the factors included in the model explain the excess returns
of the funds in our sample. A positive SMB coefficient indicates that the fund returns are more
aligned with those of small-cap stocks rather than large-cap stocks of the FTSE 350 index,
while a positive HML coefficient indicates, that the fund returns are more aligned with those
of value, rather than growth stocks. A high MOM factor indicates that the funds are mostly
invested in high momentum stocks rather than low momentum stocks. Table 5 summarizes the
descriptive statistics for the Alphas (intercepts) obtained from the Carhart’s Four Factor
regression models for each of the six sub-periods.
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Table 6: Abnormal Return Descriptive Statistics
The table below shows the descriptive statistics of the Alpha (intercept) values obtained from regressing the
excess returns of 119 UK investment trusts on Carhart’s Four-Factor model over the period from January 1997
to December 2014 in the following way:
Rt – Rf = αt + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt + Ɛt
The Alpha    represents the abnormal fund return based on the model above. It is a measure of the fund
manager’s stock selection ability. The values at the bottom of the table represent the average across all six sub-
periods.
Variable Period
Mean
abnormal
return
(%)
Median
abnormal
return
(%)
Minimum
abnormal
return
(%)
Maximum
abnormal
return
(%)
Standard
Deviation
(%)
No of Obs.
Alpha
(abnormal
return)
1997-
1999 -0.234 -0.278 -3.231 3.818 0.758 119
2000-
2002 0.449 0.203 -4.876 8.481 1.455 119
2003-
2005 -0.035 -0.099 -3.416 2.674 0.766 119
2006-
2008 0.055 0.132 -2.919 1.346 0.646 119
2009-
2011 -0.149 -0.170 -2.092 1.357 0.620 119
2012-
2014 -0.057 -0.090 -2.111 2.755 0.541 119
Average 1997-2014 0.004 -0.05 -3.108 3.405 0.798 714
The Alpha represents the abnormal returns, which were calculated with Carhart’s Four-Factor
model. A positive Alpha indicates that the fund generates abnormal returns above the FTSE
350 benchmark after controlling for market returns, SMB, HML and momentum factors,
whereas a negative Alpha indicates that the fund generates negative abnormal returns below
the FTSE 350 benchmark. The descriptive result indicates that the mean Alphas of UK
investment trusts generate negative abnormal returns in four out of six sub-periods. However,
the fund managers are only able to generate an average abnormal return of 0.004% across the
whole investigation period. The average median of -0.05% indicates that funds rather
underperform. The average standard deviation of 0.798% indicates that there is dispersion
among the abnormal fund returns, meaning that some funds underperform, while other funds
outperform. However, as can be seen in Table 4, the obtained Alphas are insignificant for three
out of six sub-periods and are also insignificant when looking at the whole time period from
January 1997 to December 2014. Thus the null hypothesis is accepted, that UK closed-end
investment trusts do not generate abnormal returns above those of the FTSE 350 benchmark.
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Persistence Results
To test the persistence in performance of 119 UK investment trusts, the 18-year evaluation
period from January 1997 to December 2014 is divided into six non-overlapping three year
sub-periods. Persistence is measured by separating the funds and checking for the correlation
of winners in each of the sub-periods using Pearson’s Correlation coefficient and OLS
regression. The Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient is used in order to investigate if there is a
correlation between the abnormal fund returns of the prior period with the following period.
Table 7 summarizes the results for each sub-period pair.
Table 7: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient Results
The table below summarises the results of the Person’s Correlation test for winning funds of each sub-period
of the 119 UK domestic investment trusts sample over six non-overlapping three-year periods from January
1997 to December 2014.
The period pair numbers represent the investigated sub-periods. The pair numbers represent the following
periods: 1997-1999 (sub-period 1); 2000- 2002 (sub-period 2); 2003 – 2005 (sub-period 3); 2006 – 2008 (sub-
period 4); 2009 -2011 (sub-period 5) and 2012 -2014 (sub-period 6).
Period pair Sub-period1&2
Sub-period
2&3
Sub-period
3&4
Sub-period
4&5
Sub-period
5&6
Correlation
Coefficient -0.545* 0.002 -0.495* 0.205*** -0.149
Number of
‘Winning’
funds
28 75 49 72 42
* indicates a significance at 1% level
*** indicates a significance at 10% level
Results of the Pearson’s Correlation test show some significant persistence in performance,
with negative correlations in sub-periods 1 & 2, and 3 & 4 with coefficients of -0.545 and -
0.485 at 1% level respectively but with no consistent pattern. However sub-period 4 & 5 is
significant and positive with a coefficient of 0.205 at 10% level indicating a reversal in
performance from one period to the following period. The highest positive coefficient is 0.205
at 10% level of significance at sub-period 4 and 5 and the lowest is -0.545 at 1% level of
significance at sub-period 1 and 2 which overall indicates that there is little persistence in fund
performance. Thus concluding, that there is no evidence of persistence in performance of the
UK domestic investment trusts.
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We further use the OLS to evaluate, if prior performance can be used as a predictor of future
performance. The following periods alphas (intercepts) are used as the dependent variable and
the prior periods intercepts as the independent variable. Table 8 summarises the results from
the OLS regressions.
Table 8: Ordinary Least Square Regression Results
The table below shows the results of the OLS regression of the funds abnormal returns on their lagged
abnormal returns for 119 UK domestic investment trusts over non-overlapping three-year periods from January
1997 to December 2014: r  = α + βr    + ε
where rt represents the abnormal returns of period t and rt-1 represent the abnormal returns
of period t-1.
The Period pair numbers represent the investigated sub-periods. The pair numbers represent the following
periods: 1997-1999 (sub-period 1); 2000- 2002 (sub-period 2); 2003 – 2005 (sub-period 3); 2006 – 2008
(sub-period 4); 2009 -2011 (sub-period 5) and 2012 -2014 (sub-period 6).
.
Period pair Sub-period1 & 2
Sub-period
2&3
Sub-period
3&4
Sub-period
4&5
Sub-period
5&6
Coefficient
(Beta) -0.524 -0.085 0.037 0.163 0.048
p-value of
coefficient 0.003 0.08 0.636 0.065 0.56
R2 (%) 7.46 2.59 0.19 2.88 0.3
No. of Obs. 119 119 119 119 119
The result in the table indicate that two out of five sub-period pairs have negative slope
coefficients, which indicates a reversal and inconsistent pattern in performance. This is
consistent with the results from the Pearson’s Correlation test which shows incongruence in
the persistence of the performance in the sub-periods. Despite the significance of the results,
the low R2 values, which lie between 0.3% and 7.46% indicate, that only 0.3% to 7.46% of
future abnormal returns can be explained by past abnormal returns. Thus, indicating that prior
performance cannot be used as an indicator of future performance.
These results support the winner and loser result (Table 2) above which shows incongruence
in the persistence of the funds. For example, while sub-periods the percentage of losers high in
sub-periods 1, 3, 4 and 5, there are winners’ funds in sub-periods 2 and 4. These results
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demonstrate that the persistence of the fund performance is inconsistent and therefore cannot
be a reliable measure of future performance.
Result of IFRS and UK investment trust performance
This section explains result of the influence of the mandatory EU wide adoption of accounting
standards on UK domestic investment trust performance. As described earlier, in order to test
whether the adoption of IFRS has an influence on the performance of 119 UK investment trusts,
we use a modified version of the Carhart Four-Factor model with a dummy variable to capture
the effect of the mandatory IFRS adoption over the period January 1997 to December 2014,
regressed the excess returns of 119 investment trusts in the sample on the pre and post adoption
performance with 2005 as base year. CRISIS is a dummy that captures the effects of the 2007-
2009 financial crisis reaching from the highest point of the FTSE 100 Index in October 2007
to the lowest point in March 2009 (1= from October 2007 to March 2009 and 0 otherwise).
Where CRISIS is negative and significant, then we can conclude that it is indeed the effect of
regime change. Table 8 presents the regression results rounded to four decimals.
The results of the test show a negative mean coefficient of the dummy variable (AAS) of -
0.0020, which implies that on average the EU wide adoption of IFRS has a negative impact of
-0.20 % on excess fund returns. The coefficients range between -0.0265 and 0.0115 with a
standard deviation of 0.065 which suggests that the adoption of IFRS has an increasing effect
on some funds, and a decreasing effect on others but with an overall negative effect on the UK
investment funds. On average, 60% of the excess fund returns could be explained by the
modified Carhart Four-Factor model. The CRISIS dummy is insignificant which suggests that
the result is not affected by the financial crisis.
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Table 9: Descriptive Result of the Modified Carhart Model
The table shows the descriptive statistics of the obtained coefficients from 119 regressions of funds excess
returns against the modified Carhart Four-Factor model over the period from January 1997 to December 2014 in
the following way:
Rt – Rf = αt + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt + β5AASt + β6CRISISt + Ɛt
where AAS is the dummy variable for the Adoption of Accounting Standards (0 = from January 1997 to December
2004; 1 = from January 2005 to December 2014) . “Crisis” is the dummy to capture the effects of the 2007-2009
financial crisis reaching from the highest point of the FTSE 100 Index in October 2007 to the lowest point in
March 2009 (1= from October 2007 to March 2009 and 0 otherwise); all other factors as in Carhart’s Four-Factor
Model. A positive coefficient implies that the adoption of accounting standards increased the funds excess returns,
while a negative coefficient implies the opposite.
Variable Period Mean Median Minimum Maximum StandardDeviation
No of
Obs.
Intercept
Coefficient
1997-
2014 0.001** -0.00001 -0.0138 0.0178 0.0051 119
RMRF
Coefficient
1997-
2014 0.8786* 0.9662 0.0256 1.7547 0.3554 119
SMB
Coefficient
1997-
2014 0.2729* 0.1645 -0.1521 0.9769 0.2942 119
HML
Coefficient
1997-
2014 -0.1332* -0.0812 -1.3013 0.3588 0.2540 119
MOM
Coefficient
1997-
2014 -0.008 -0.0111 -0.203 0.1989 0.0725 119
AAS
dummy
coefficient
1997-
2014 -0.0020* -0.0015 -0.0265 0.0115 0.0065 119
Crisis
dummy
Coefficient
1997-
2014 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0656 0.0285 0.0129 119
R2 1997-2014 0.601 0.7083 0.018 0.8995 0.2513 119
* indicates a significance at 1% level
** indicates a significance at 5% level
*** indicates a significance at 10% level
The average effect on the funds’ excess returns caused by the adoption of accounting standards
is -0.20% and significant, implying that the adoption of accounting standards made the UK
market more efficient but with a decreasing influence on funds’ excess returns.
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Robustness check of IFRS adoption on UK investment trust performance
In the previous section, the excess returns of 119 UK investment trusts were regressed on a
modified version of the Carhart Four-Factor model by including IFRS and CRISIS proxies. In
order to prove that the result is not just capturing the shift in the regime and not the IFRS impact
or affected by the construction procedure, we re-estimated the model using same observations
from 1998 until end of 2006, prior to the financial crisis. This is to check if the negative effect
persists. The result indicates that the AAS is still negative and significant with a R2 of 62% and
confirms that the negative effect of IFRS on the investment funds returns. Table 10 summarises
the results from the robustness test. Hence, the robustness results confirm our previous
findings, that IFRS adoption has a negative impact on performance of investment trust returns.
Table 10: Robustness Tests Results
The table shows the results of the robustness test of the proxy for the adoption of IFRS from 119 regressions
of funds returns over the period from January 1997 to December 2006 in the following way:
Rt – Rf = αt + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt + β5AASt +  Ɛt
where AAS is the dummy variable for the Adoption of Accounting Standards (0 = from January 1997 to
December 2004; 1 = from January 2005 to December 2006); all other factors as in Market Model.
7.
Variable Period Mean Median Minimum Maximum StandardDeviation No. of Obs.
Intercept
Coefficient
1997-
2006 0.0007 -0.0006 -0.018 0.0169 0.0055 119
RM
Coefficient
1997-
2006 0.8817* 0.9692 -0.0641 1.9263 0.3530 119
SMB
Coefficient
1997-
2006 0.3853* 0.2937 -0.052 1.3139 0.3321 119
HML
Coefficient
1997-
2006 -0.0908* -0.0562 -1.3928 0.3676 0.2832 119
MOM
Coefficient
1997-
2006 -0.0061 0.0007 -0.2521 0.3004 0.089 119
AAS
dummy
coefficient
1997-
2006 -0.0017** -0.0005 -0.0352 0.0122 0.0078 119
R2 1997-2006 0.6242 0.7242 0.0395 0.8919 0.2478 119
* indicates a significance at 1% level,
** indicates a significance at 5% level,
*** indicates a significance at 10% level
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8. Summary of findings
The results of the alphas for three out of our six sub-periods and the model are insignificant.
Thus, the null hypothesis is accepted, concluding that UK domestic investment trusts do not
generate significant abnormal returns above the benchmark. We control for market return,
SMB, HML and Momentum factors. These findings support Bal and Leger (1996) perform
analysis of UK investment trusts from 1975 to 1993 and find that on average funds
underperformed compared to the market portfolio. These results are also similar to those
obtained in US studies on open-end fund market (Zhang, 1999). Therefore, even though the
results of this study suggest that the US and UK fund markets share characteristics, our study
is based on a more recent sample from 1997-2014.
The second objective of this study is to test for any persistence in fund performance. The
analysis is conducted by forming five sub-period pairs out of our six three-year sub-periods.
Persistence in performance is then analysed between each sub-period paired. The first
persistence analysis is conducted by calculating the Pearson’s Correlation coefficient between
each of the six sub-period pairs. The results show negative correlations with no consistent
pattern between the sub-periods suggesting a reversal in performance between sub-period.
There is no evidence of any significant persistence in performance over the evaluation period.
The second persistence analysis is conducted using the OLS regression to evaluate if prior
performance can be used to predict future performance. The regression is constructed by using
the preceding period’s alphas (intercepts) as variables. The result indicates that two of the
obtained coefficients are negative, supporting the results from the Pearson’s Correlation
Coefficient test that the fund performance is incongruent over the sub-periods. Although one
of the obtained correlation coefficients is significant at 1% level of significance and two are
significant at 10% level, the overall model has very low R2 values between 0.3% and 7.46%.
In summary, we find no evidence of persistence in the performance of UK investment trusts
and that prior performance of UK investment trusts is not a good predictor of their future
performance.
The third objective of our study is to analyse if the EU wide mandatory adoption of the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in January 2005 had an influence on the
performance of UK investment trusts. The result of the analysis shows a negative mean
coefficient of AAS variable which implies that on average, the EU wide adoption of IFRS had
a decreasing impact on the excess returns of UK domestic investment trusts. The negative
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impact obtained is not caused by the financial crisis which preceded the IFRS adoption. The
obtained mean R2 value of the regressions implies that on average 60% of excess fund returns
is explained by the modified Carhart Four-Factor regression model. Our robustness test result
confirms our findings that on average the effect of the adoption of IFRS on funds’ excess
returns is significantly negative.
We conclude that whilst the adoption of IFRS seems to have improved the efficiency of the
UK market, it resulted in decreasing the funds excess returns. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study to investigate the effect of IFRS on closed–end fund. Other studies (Byard
et al., 2011; Pope and McLeay, 2011; and Horton et al, 2013), have focused on the effect of
the mandatory adoption of IFRS on financial analysts’ information environment. These studies
suggest that forecast errors as well as forecast dispersion decreased and the overall information
environment improved in countries such as the United Kingdom after the adoption of IFRS.
Since fund managers use analyst reports to make investment decisions their findings
corroborate our finding on the increased efficiency of the market following the IFRS adoption.
8. Conclusion
Our paper focuses on three main objectives. First, it measures the performance of UK closed-
end funds with UK domestic equity focus. The second is to examine if there is any persistence
in performance of those funds and the third, examine whether the EU wide adoption of IFRS
has any influence on the performance of those funds. Our study focuses on investment trusts
which are incorporated in the United Kingdom and have a domestic equity investment focus
from January 1997 to December 2014 and, divided into six non-overlapping three-year periods.
Our study extends the existing literature on closed-end funds by examining the performance of
UK domestic investment trusts over a more recent time period. Furthermore, our paper makes
significant contribution to the extant literature on the mandatory IFRS adoption in the UK by
investigating the impact of the adoption on the performance of UK domestic investment trusts.
The result indicates that on average, the adoption of IFRS has a decreasing significant impact
on the excess returns of the UK domestic investment funds. This is further corroborated by the
increased percentage of loser funds following the sub-periods after the 2005 mandatory
adoption.
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The Carhart (1997) Four-Factor model is used to determine if UK investment trusts generate
abnormal returns, while the Pearson Correlation Coefficient and the OLS regression are used
to test if the performance of UK investment trusts is persistent. The results provide evidence
that in the period from January 1997 to December 2014, the UK investment trusts did not
generate significant positive abnormal returns. The results on the persistence of fund
performance show no consistent pattern of persistence and suggesting that investment trust
performance is not persistent and that prior investment trust performance should not be used
as an indicator for future performance. The policy implication is that investors should not make
investment decisions based on the prior performance of a fund. This is because the performance
of the UK investment funds market is incongruent as it has no consistent pattern. The findings
also give some evidence of Efficient Market Hypothesis in the UK investment funds market as
the adoption of the IFRS seems to have made the markets more efficient and therefore harder
to generate abnormal returns.
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